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IS SILENCE SACRED? THE VULNERABILITY OF GRIFFIN V.
CALIFORNIA IN A TERRORIST WORLD
Lissa Griffin*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination (hereafter "the privilege") has been neither clear nor consistent.'
For one thing, as many commentators have noted, analysis of the privilege has been
"tyrannized by slogans."2 The Court's privilege jurisprudence has been marked by
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Vicki
Gannon and Linda D'Agostino for their research support, and Iris Mercado for her unflag-
ging assistance. This Article was written with the support of the Pace University Faculty
Scholarship Fund.
1 See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,56 n.5 (1964) ("'[T]he law and
the lawyers... have never made up their minds just what it is supposed to do or just whom
it is intended to protect."' (quoting Harry Kalven Jr., Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some
Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOMIC. SCI. 181, 182 (1953))).
The concept of silence being "sacred" is adapted from an article by Judge Henry Friendly,
in which he proposed amending the Fifth Amendment, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The
Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 (1968). In that article he quotes the
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 307 (1967), which raised a similar suggestion
and noted that "'the Constitution contemplates amendment, and no part of it should be so
sacred that it remains beyond review."' Friendly, supra, at 672 n.5.
This Article addresses the Fifth Amendment privilege as it has been applied to prohibit
judicial or prosecutorial comment on a defendant's decision to remain silent at trial. See Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), in which the Supreme Court held that such comment was
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. It does not address the impeachment or evidentiary use
of a defendant's pre-trial silence.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,261 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (the
roots of the privilege "go to the nature of a free man and to his relationship to the state"); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (the ideas underlying the privilege "tap the basic stream of
religious and political principle"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886) (to
allow the government to compel the production of incriminating papers is "contrary to the
principles of free government" and inconsistent with "political liberty and personal freedom");
see also Friendly, supra note 1, at 679 (commenting on "the extent to which eloquent phrases
have been accepted as a substitute for thorough thought"); Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination
and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193,209 (examining Supreme Court cases and con-
cluding that, "[lianguage like this [that the privilege is a linchpin of an accusatorial system]
no matter how often repeated, no matter how eloquently intoned, is merely restatement of the
privilege itself").
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broad, high-sounding rhetoric that has not always matched an equally broad interpre-
tation of the right. For another, the Court has exhibited two distinct and inconsistent
approaches to the privilege. One approach interprets it broadly as the linchpin of an
accusatorial system that insures that the government bears the burden of proving guilt
without any help from the defendant.3 The other approach, based on text and history,
interprets the privilege more narrowly as a protection against coercive methods of
interrogation only.4 While in practice the two approaches often produce the same
result, they clash in one important context-when the government is allowed to use
a defendant's silence at trial as substantive evidence of guilt. Under the Supreme
Court's decision in Griffin v. California,5 that use is not allowed: a prosecutor's com-
ment to the jury on a defendant's failure to testify violates the privilege.6
In its most recent foray in this area, its 1999 decision in United States v. Mitchell,
7
the Supreme Court extended Griffin's no-comment rule to sentencing, refusing to allow
the sentencing court to rely on a defendant's silence to prove facts relevant to sen-
tence.8 The Court held, inter alia, that the refusal to allow use of a defendant's silence
to prove the prosecution's case was one of the hallmarks of the U.S. criminal accu-
satory process.9 Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O'Connor and Justice Thomas.'° Justice Scalia argued that Griffin lacked historical
and textual support, had been a constitutional "wrong turn," and should not be ex-
tended." Justice Thomas also dissented, but he argued that Griffin should be over-
ruled outright.12
As the Mitchell decision indicates, several reasons demonstrate the need to re-
evaluate the constitutional basis for the no-comment rule at this time. The first reason
is the uncertain mooring of the privilege doctrinally, as represented in the opinions
in Mitchell. The second reason is the narrow majority in Mitchell for extending Griffin,
the explicit or implicit willingness to overrule Griffin by two members of the Court,
and the recent departure and replacement of two Justices in the Mitchell majority. The
third reason is the privilege's perpetually disfavored status as an anti-truth-seeking
' See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999); see also, Friendly, supra note
1, at 671-72 (commenting that this view "has become a kind of obsession which has stretched
the privilege beyond not only its language and history but any justification in policy, and threat-
ens to go further still").
4 AlbertW. Alschuler, A PeculiarPrivilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2625, 2625-29 (1996).
5 Griffin, 380 U.S. 609.
6 Id.
7 526 U.S. 314.
8 Id. at 315.
9 See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
'o Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 316.
" Id. at 336.
12 Id. at 341-42.
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right.' 3 Finally, of course, this disfavored status is particularly dangerous in light
of the modem threat of domestic terrorism. 4 A re-evaluation of the no-comment
rule may be significantly aided by examining the United Kingdom's approach to the
privilege, particularly its approach to using a defendant's silence at trial. Unlike the
situation in the United States, in the United Kingdom, where there is no written con-
stitutional text, the fact-finder is allowed to use a defendant's silence as proof of guilt. 5
While the United States and the United Kingdom share a significant history with
respect to the privilege, a history that established the right as an integral part of both
criminal processes, the histories diverge following the colonial period. From that
point onward, the United States construed the privilege more broadly as a limitation
on the powers of government.' 6 This uniquely U.S. experience-and one that con-
tinued into the twentieth century-explains, to some extent, the differences that exist
today. The other explanation is the United Kingdom's experience with Northern
Ireland terrorism, an experience that ultimately changed not only criminal procedures
relating to terrorists, but mainstream U.K. criminal procedure as well. It remains to
be seen whether the U.S. experience with terrorism will lead to similar changes here.
Part I of this Article traces the shared history of the right against self-incrimination
from twelfth-century England to the mid-twentieth century. Part II examines the
modem history of the privilege in the United States, from the Supreme Court's 1965
decision in Griffin to its 1999 decision in Mitchell. Part I examines the United
Kingdom's modem approach to the privilege, including its re-shaping of the priv-
ilege in response to domestic terrorism. Part IV examines why the U.S. and U.K.
systems, with a common history and shared values, have moved in such dramatically
different directions with respect to the privilege. Part V assesses the possibility that
the privilege, already vulnerable, will be curtailed by the new Court along the lines
of the United Kingdom's procedures.
"3 See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 1, at 679-80 (while other privileges may retard the search
for truth, the Fifth Amendment privilege extends only to people who may have broken the law,
defies the "notions of decent conduct," and prevents restitution to the victim); Roscoe Pound,
Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1014, 1015 (1934) (the privilege does not help the innocent but serves the evil designs of the
guilty who are well advised by counsel to employ it). Indeed, in noting the expansive inter-
pretation of the privilege, Professor Wigmore prophesied that "a reaction must come. A true
conservatism must recommence to operate." JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at
3102 (1st ed. 1904). That has not happened yet, although it is more likely now, as occurred
in the United Kingdom, see infra pp. 949-55, in light of the threat of domestic terrorism. See
infra pp. 955-58.
'" Several commentators have noted the responsiveness of the privilege to contemporary
events. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2251, at 3102 ("Neither the history of the privi-
lege, nor its firm constitutional anchorage, need deter us from discussing at this day its policy.");
Friendly, supra note 1, at 678 ("The privilege has always been responsive to the particular
needs and problems of the time.").
15 See infra Part III.
16 For a full discussion of this historical period, see infra Part I.
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I. SHARED HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE
A. Introduction
Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum-no man is bound to accuse himself-the rule
is ancient and has been interpreted in many different and inconsistent ways. Although
no one knows its European origin, it is likely that the privilege began as a limitation
on the duty to confess one's sins-to accuse one's self without charge-in the eccle-
siastic courts. It first appeared in the twelfth century English system of criminal justice.
Throughout its early English history, the privilege represented the battleground be-
tween the ecclesiastic courts and the royal prerogative, as the common law courts were
called upon to exercise control over the ecclesiastic courts and their coercive practices.
It also represented the difference between both the accusatory and inquisitorial systems,
and among the common law, canon law, and civil law.
B. Confession v. Incrimination
Early on, defendants in England and on the European continent (the ius commune)7
were expected to speak and were regularly interrogated in an effort to establish their
guilt. Without any charges being brought or any evidence to support any charges, citi-
zens were brought to ecclesiastical courts, made to swear an oath, and questioned about
their religious beliefs and practices. 8 The purpose of the oath was to find a basis for
charging a defendant, that is, to get a confession to some ecclesiastical wrong that
could then serve as the basis for bringing criminal charges. 9 The earliest form of the
doctrine of nemo tenetur was intended only to prevent self-accusation by physical tor-
ture (secular coercion) or oath ex officio (ecclesiastical coercion).2°
By the seventeenth century, the privilege had evolved to include "a right not to
be interrogated [in the ecclesiastical courts] under oath in the absence of well-grounded
suspicion."'2 The ecclesiastical courts could conduct incriminating interrogation but
only after there was evidence of criminal conduct and a charge had been brought.
22
One had to be accused of something, and imposition of a general oath to answer any
and all questions asked was banned.23 In short, then, what was not allowed was what
17 R.H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (1997) ("The term ius commune, translated literally as 'common law,'
refers to the combination of the Roman and Canon laws that was the product of the revival
of juristic science in the twelfth century.").
I Id. at 101.
19 Id. at 62.
20 Friendly, supra note 1, at 677.
21 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2640; see also HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 61.
22 HELMHOLZ ETAL., supra note 17, at 61.
23 Id. at 61-62.
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would be known today as a "fishing expedition."'24 The rule also prohibited the call-
ing of a person into court for the purpose of examining the "secret thoughts of his
heart, or... his secret opinion."25 In other words, no one could be called into court
and questioned in an effort to establish heresy. Finally, the rule prohibited exami-
nation under oath in all except testamentary or matrimonial cases.26
C. The Ex Officio Oath: The Marian Inquisition and the Puritans
In the early seventeenth century, Puritanism and the common-law courts joined
forces to protest the administration of the oath ex officio in the ecclesiastical High
Commission.27 The use of the oath had evolved beyond forcing someone to reveal
the basis for his own accusation to requiring actual testimony against one's self. This
practice was viewed as "an outrage on human dignity and a violation of the very in-
stinct of self-preservation. 28 Opposition to the oath had become both religious and
secular: it was based on the belief that the Bible prohibited swearing in God's name,
that the requirement of an oath violated conscience, and that the oath permitted re-
ligious persecution without proper accusation by witnesses or a grand jury.29
John Lilburne is credited with the final abolition of the oath ex officio.3 Lilburne
was made to take the oath in the Star Chamber, which bound him to answer all ques-
tions posed to him.3' He refused to answer any "'impertinent questions, for fear that
with my answer I may do myself hurt."32 Others followed his example.33 As a result,
the courts recognized a right that did not prohibit inquiry or prevent self-incrimination
but that did permit a defendant to refuse to answer any questions without penalty.34
Under the statute of 1640, the practice of interrogating defendants under oath in the
ecclesiastical courts was prohibited.35 With the abolition of the Star Chamber and the
High Commission soon after, in 1641, the common law courts had gained supremacy
over coercive ecclesiastical practices.36
Interestingly, no sooner had the right to refuse to answer been recognized then it
became virtually useless in light of the disqualification of an accused from testifying.
Moreover, while the new right to refuse to answer incriminating questions did impose
24 Id. at 62.
25 Id. at 63.
26 Id. at 63-64.
27 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FuH AMENDMENT 262-63 (1968).
28 Id at 263.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 271-72.
31 Id. at 274.
32 Id. at 273. For a full discussion of the proceedings against Lilburne, see id. at 271-78.
3 Id. at 278.
14 Id. at 282.
11 Id. at 278-82.
36 Id. at 281-83.
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some limitations on pre-trial interrogation, it did not prohibit it.37 The Marian
Committal Statute of 1555 remained in effect and required justices of the peace, who
were prosecutors as well as justices, to examine suspects and to record anything ma-
terial.3" The record of such examination was then read into trial against the defen-
dant.39 Such suspects, however, could not be forced to take an oath, because the oath
was viewed as coercion.' Coerced or extorted confessions could not be used, largely
because they were deemed unreliable. 4 However, "until the mid-eighteenth century,
the record of the... examination was read routinely at... trial."42 If the defendant had
refused to speak to the justice of the peace-as was his or her right-this fact would
be reported to the jury.43
Coercive practices also existed at trial. Although defendants charged with felo-
nies could not be compelled to speak at trial, they were not entitled to counsel and, as
a practical matter, they were expected to respond to the prosecution's evidence and
prove their innocence.44 Most defendants therefore defended themselves by answer-
ing questions or rebutting witnesses. While the trial judges tried to help the defen-
dants, a defendant's silence was inevitably suicidal, since there was no one else to help
conduct a defense.45
Thus, by the colonial era, although the accused had a right to silence, as a prac-
tical matter he was expected to be a source of at least unswom evidence pretrial, which
could be read into the record at trial. Certainly in this era there was no prohibition
against use of his silence at trial.'
D. British North America
These same conditions existed in the colonies. Indeed, British North Americans
claimed no more than the rights of English subjects and English common law. As in
England, only two protections existed: absent well-grounded suspicion, a suspect had
a right to silence; and suspects could not be subjected to torture or physical coercion
or forced to take an oath.4 7 The Body of Liberties of 1641 (Liberty 45) stated that tor-
ture could not be used to secure a confession except after conviction in capital cases
37 HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 91.
38 Id.
39 id.
o Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2649.
41 LEVY, supra note 27, at 328.
42 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2654.
41 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4 For a thorough description of the criminal trial during this period, see HELMHoLzEr AL.,
supra note 17, at 82-96.
41 Id. at 107.
46 Id. at 92.
41 Id. at 121.
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to find conspirators." But even in that circumstance there could be no "[b]arbarous
and inhumane" torture.49 Again, following the Marian procedures, justices of the peace
were expected to elicit a confession from the defendant that could be used against him
at a trial, but only if he had not been sworn.50 These interrogation procedures were
well established and widely accepted."
E. The Fifth Amendment
As noted above, when the Constitution was drafted, it was not meant to reform the
law. Instead, it was intended to protect existing procedures from the whims of the
distant king, i.e. to protect the status quo from incursions by the Crown. 2 The King
had begun to use the vice-admiralty procedures to try ordinary criminal offenses on
land." These were military courts, presided over by judges from England, and relied
upon the hated oath ex officio.' They did not allow juries.5 Ultimately, Parliament
threatened to re-enact Henry VIII's Treason Act, which required that the trials actually
take place in England.56
In the face of these increasingly intrusive imperial measures, the rhetoric of in-
dividual rights increased in intensity. Clearly, however, the cluster of individual
rights ultimately embodied in the Bill of Rights was intended as defensive, not as
reform.5 7 The Virginia Declaration of Rights contained similar provisions, and other
state constitutions reflected this rights cluster as well.58 In this historical context, the
Fifth Amendment was born.
F. Nineteenth Century Developments
Despite U.S. independence, the right to remain silent continued to be treated simi-
larly by both the United States and the United Kingdom. The development of the
no-comment rule in the nineteenth century was influenced by (1) the appearance of
defense counsel; (2) the abolition of the defendant and disqualification based on in-
terest; and (3) the creation of a statutory no-comment rule.
48 LEVY, supra note 27, at 344-45.
49 Id.
50 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2649 & nn.86-88.
5' LEVY, supra note 27, at 333-44; Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2655 & n.108.
52 HELMHOLZET AL., supra note 17, at 129-33.
53 Id. at 131-33.
54 Id.
51 Id. at 131.
56 Id. at 133.
" Id. at 134-35.
58 Id.
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1. The Role of Defense Counsel
In both the U.S. and U.K. systems lawyers began to appear more frequently, al-
lowing the defendant to take a more passive role. Thus, at this point, "the dignity of
defendants lay not in their ability to tell their stories fully, but rather in their ability
to remain passive, to proclaim to the prosecutor 'Thou sayest,' and to force the state
to shoulder the entire load."59 As defendants were allowed and expected to participate
less, they began to be seen as potential victims of state coercion.'
Nevertheless, in the United States the pre-trial Marian Committal procedures con-
tinued. Suspects continued to be questioned, unswom, before trial and their state-
ments or silence used in evidence at trial.6'
Similarly, in the United Kingdom after the American revolution, reformers in
Parliament began to argue that requiring the defendant to speak was unfair to un-
educated and inarticulate defendants who could not tell their stories well. 62 The
reformers argued for an increased role of counsel to protect these defendants, and
thus, in 1836, the right to counsel was secured.63 Similar to what was occurring in the
United States at the time, defendants were able to take a more passive role at trial.64
Then, in 1848, Sir John Jervis's Act made a substantial change to the pre-trial Marian
Committal procedures: for the first time, an accused was required to be cautioned,
before pretrial questioning, that he need not answer any questions and that if he did
answer, his answers could be used against him at trial.65
2. Abolition of the Disqualification for Interest
The next significant step was the abolition of the testimonial disqualification of
defendants. Maine was the first U.S. jurisdiction to allow defendants to offer sworn
testimony in criminal cases, in 1864.' By the end of the 1890s, Georgia was the only
state to disqualify defendants.67
Abolition of the disqualification was hotly contested on both continents. In the
United Statcs, those in favor of abolition argued that the disqualification presumed
guilt and a willingness to commit perjury.68 Those in opposition argued that abolition
would force defendants to speak, contrary to the Fifth Amendment.69 They argued that
" Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2660.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 2654-55.
62 HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 96.
63 Id. at 147.
64 Id. at 144, 147.
65 Id. at 169-70.
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the failure of a defendant to testify would be seen as a confession of guilt and that
jurors would draw this inference regardless of any instructions they might receive.7"
To avoid the inference, many defendants would commit perjury.7'
3. The Statutory No-Comment Rules
In deference to these concerns, the federal statute of 1878, and many others, gave
the defendant a right to testify, provided that the prosecutor could not comment on the
failure of a defendant to testify, and prohibited any presumption against the defendant
from his failure to take the stand.72 In Wilson v. United States, 7 3 the Supreme Court
reversed a federal conviction based on a prosecutor's argument that the defendant's
silence was evidence of guilt.74 The no-comment rule was determined to be statutory.
At no time in that opinion or elsewhere did the Court hold that a negative inference
from silence was prohibited by the Constitution. 7
Indeed, in Twining v. New Jersey7 6 and Adamson v. California,77 the Supreme
Court explicitly held that state rules permitting adverse comment on a defendant's
failure to testify at trial were not prohibited by the Due Process Clause. In Twining,
the Court held that the state law permitting a prosecutor to argue for an adverse infer-
ence from a defendant's silence at trial did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.8 In Adamson, the Court reached the same conclusion when it refused
to hold that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was an element
of due process that could bind the states. 79 In so holding, it assumed, but did not de-
cide, that the Fifth Amendment would prohibit such comment in a federal proceed-
ing.8° At this point in history, then, there was no authority to support the conclusion
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2661-62.
72 Id. at 2662 (citing Act of Mar. 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481
(1994))).
73 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
74 Id. at 66-67.
" See, e.g., id at 64. Thereafter, the Supreme Court held that drawing adverse inferences
from selective silence by a testifying defendant, see Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470
(1917), and impeaching a defendant's testimony by disclosing his silence at an earlier trial, see
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), were consistent with the Fifth Amendment
privilege.
76 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
77 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
78 Twining, 211 U.S. at 114.
79 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 46-47. In a series of cases, the Court continued to reaffirm that
the self-incrimination privilege in the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states. See Knapp
v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 374 (1958); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937),
overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97 (1934), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
" Adamson, 322 U.S. at 50-51.
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that the right against self-incrimination prohibited comment on a defendant's failure
to testify.
In the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, the English counterpart of the U.S. Act of
1878,1 the United Kingdom abolished the disqualification based on interest and the
no-comment rule. Similar to the U.S. act, the Criminal Evidence Act stated that "'the
failure of any person charged with an offence, or of the wife or husband, as the case
may be, of the person so charged, to give evidence shall not be made the subject of
any comment by the prosecution."'82
Now that defendants could testify, the courts were faced with a quandary. Was
the "witness rule," i.e., the rule of evidence that permitted witnesses (but not defen-
dants) a privilege against self-incrimination that was not waived by partial answers now
applicable to defendant-witnesses? 83 Or should the defendant's testimony be subject
to the "confession rule," under which the privilege was waived by partial answer but
an incriminatory statement by a defendant would be excluded if given under duress?'
Essentially, the U.K. courts merged the two doctrines: the "witness rule" was extended
to defendants, but it was given the exclusionary and waiver principles of the "con-
fession rule., 85 Where a defendant testified as a witness he or she retained a privilege
against self-incrimination that was waived by partial answers; any testimony given
could be excluded if given under duress.86 In this context, the giving of an oath was
considered duress' per se.87 Thus, defendants could not be made to testify at trial.
II. THE MODERN U.S. PRIVILEGE
A. Incorporation Through the Due Process Clause
Ultimately in 1964, the federal statutory no-comment rule was constitutionalized.
In Malloy v. Hogan, the Supreme Court finally held that the privilege against self-
incrimination was protected against state action by incorporation in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 8 Malloy did not involve the no-comment rule.
In Malloy, the petitioner pled guilty to state charges of selling pools. After his guilty
plea he was ordered to testify before a referee investigating gambling.89 Petitioner
8 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2662; Carol A. Chase, Hearing the "Sounds of Silence" in
Criminal Trials: A Look at Recent British Law Reforms With an Eye Toward Reforming the
American Criminal Justice System, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 929, 933-35 (1996).
82 Chase, supra note 81, at 934 (quoting Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, Eliz. § 1 (a) (Eng.)).
83 HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 156-61.
Id. at 153-56.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 162, 171-74.
87 Id. at 174.
88 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
89 Id. at 3.
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invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify? The lower court held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege was not available to a witness in a state proceeding.9 However,
re-examining and overruling its decisions in Adamson and Twining, the Supreme Court
held that the federal Fifth Amendment privilege was binding on the states through
incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.92 In doing so, the
Court rejected the suggestion that a less stringent constitutional standard applied to
the states, and required state conformity with the entire federal standard.93
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark, dissented.' 4 The dissenters took issue with
the Court's approach of "incorporating into due process, without critical examination,
the whole body of law which surrounds a specific prohibition directed against the
Federal Government." 95 To Justice Harlan, the Court's precedent established that the
standard for incorporation of any part of the Bill of Rights was due process.96 Rights
that have been applied to both federal and state equally, for example, First Amendment
or Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel protections, were applied equally because the
fundamental fairness of due process demanded it. According to Justice Harlan, the
basic structure of federalism prohibited the kind of uniformity that the Court's de-
cision would require of the states.97
1. Griffin v. California
In 1964, the Court re-considered the specific question posed in Twining and
Adamson: whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited a prosecutor in
a state criminal trial from arguing, and a court from inviting ajury to draw an unfavor-
able inference from a defendant's failure to testify. In Griffin, a murder prosecution,
the prosecutor, relying on a California statute, had argued to the jury in summation
that the defendant, who had not testified but who had been with the victim before her
death and was the only person who could provide details related to the murder, had
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 2-3.
13 Id. at 11 ("It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity
of a claim of privilege ... depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal
court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a
federal or state proceeding is justified.").
94 Id. at 14. Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented separately on the ground that
the privilege had not been properly invoked because there was insufficient evidence that re-
spondent had a "reasonable apprehension" of self-incrimination. Id. at 34, 38.
9' Id. at 16.
96 Id. at 16-17.
97 Id. at 28. Referring to the above noted argument, Justice Harlan said, "Such 'incongruity,'
however, is at the heart of our federal system. The powers and responsibilities of the state
and federal governments are not congruent; under our Constitution, they are not intended to
be." Id. at 27.
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"not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain."98 In addition, in accordance with
the statute,99 the trial court had instructed the jury that "a defendant has a constitutional
right not to testify" and the defendant's silence did not "create a presumption of guilt
nor by itself warrant an inference of guilt nor relieve the prosecution of any of its bur-
den of proof."'1'0 However, the state court then charged that, as to the facts within the
defendant's knowledge, "the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending
to indicate the truth of [the state's] evidence and as indicating that among the infer-
ences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are
the more probable."' 0'
In an opinion by Justice Douglas for a five-member majority, the Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, with Justice Harlan concurring, Justices Stewart and White
dissenting, and Chief Justice Warren taking no part. 0 2 Calling adverse comment on
silence a remnant of "the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,""' 1°3 the Court held
that the instruction created a penalty for the decision to remain silent that "cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion costly."'' "4
The Griffin decision is an unusual one, remarkably oblique. It begins by stating,
"[ilf this were a federal trial, reversible error would have been committed."''0 5 The
Court based its conclusion on Wilson v. United States,'°6 a decision it acknowledged
rested on an act of Congress and not the Fifth Amendment. 1 7 It went on to hold, how-
ever, that the prosecutor's comment and the court's instructions also violated the Fifth
Amendment. 0 8 The majority did not, however, rest its conclusion on history, prev-
alence, or actual text, the analytical bases for constitutional analysis.'0 Rather, the
Court continued,
If the words 'Fifth Amendment' are substituted for 'act' and for
'statute,' the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is reflected.
98 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 (1965).
9 Id. at 609-10 (citing CAL. CONST. art I, § 13 (repealed 1974)).
'O Id. at 610.
'O' Id.
102 Id. at 609, 615, 617.
113 Id. at 614 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 612.
'06 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
107 Griffin, 380 U.S. 612-13; see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Bruno
v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
108 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613. The Court noted that the federal statute was designed in part
to protect those "who might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence which the law
gives to every one, and not wish to be witnesses. It is not every one who can safely venture
on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him." Id. (citing Wilson,
149 U.S. at 66).
'09 See id.
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For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'in-
quisitorial system of criminal justice,' which the Fifth Amend-
ment outlaws." 0
Having converted a statutory enactment into a constitutional one, the Court then
relied on precedent to impose that standard on the states:
We said in Malloy v. Hogan that 'the same standards must de-
termine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state
proceeding is justified.' We take that in its literal sense and hold
that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal
Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prose-
cution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that
such silence is evidence of guilt."'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan began by agreeing that the Fifth Amend-
ment would bar adverse comment on a defendant's silence in federal court." 2 He also
agreed, in light of Malloy's holding incorporating the Fifth Amendment against the
states, that there was "no legitimate escape from today's decision."' 3 He thus con-
curred in the majority decision, but explained:
I do so, however, with great reluctance, since for me the decision
exemplifies the creeping paralysis with which this Court's recent
adoption of the 'incorporation' doctrine is infecting the operation
of the federal system.
While I would agree that the accusatorial rather than inquisitorial
process is a fundamental part of the 'liberty' guaranteed by the
"o Id. at 613-14 (citation omitted).
It is said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to
facts peculiarly within the accused's knowledge is in any event natural
and irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not magnify that
inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege. What the
jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may
infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence
against him is quite another.
Id. at 614.
... Id. at 615 (citation omitted). The Court reserved decision on whether such an instruction
would be constitutionally required if requested. Id. at 615 n.6.
112 Id. at 615.
"' Id. at 615-16.
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Fourteenth Amendment, my Brother Stewart in dissent, .... fully
demonstrates that the no-comment rule 'might be lost, and
justice still be done.' As a 'non-fundamental' part of the Fifth
Amendment, I would not, but for Malloy, apply the no-comment
rule to the States." 4
Justice Harlan noted that the incongruity, within fundamental fairness limits, be-
tween state and federal standards "is at the heart of our federal system. The powers
and responsibilities of the State and Federal Governments are not congruent, and
under the Constitution they are not intended to be."' 5 He concluded, "Although com-
pelled to concur in this decision, I am free to express the hope that the Court will even-
tually return to constitutional paths which, until recently, it has followed throughout
its history."' 16
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice White, dissented." 7 He focused on a textual anal-
ysis, and framed the central issue as whether anything in the California statute "com-
pelled" Griffin to be a witness against himself."8 Of course, Justice Stewart noted,
Griffin did not testify, so he could not have been compelled to do so.' Moreover,
Justice Stewart disputed the majority's conclusion that the comment rule compelled tes-
timony by imposing a penalty on the exercise of the right to remain silent. 20 Accord-
ing to him, a jury is aware on its own, that a defendant has not testified; a prosecutor's
comment and a court's charge do not create that awareness.' 2' Thus, he concluded
that the Court must be looking at some other compulsion which "the Court does not
describe and which I cannot readily perceive."22 Relying, then, on history, 23 Justice
"' Id. at 616 (citations omitted).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 617.
117 id.
118 Id. at 620.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 620-21.
121 Id. at 621.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 620. Contrasting the California procedure to those of the Star Chamber, Justice
Stewart continued:
When a suspect was brought before the Court of High Commission or
the Star Chamber, he was commanded to answer whatever was asked
of him, and subjected to a far-reaching and deeply probing inquiry in an
effort to ferret out some unknown and frequently unsuspected crime. He
declined to answer on pain of incarceration, banishment, or mutilation.
And if he spoke falsely, he was subject to further punishment. Faced
with this formidable array of alternatives, his decision to speak was un-
questionably coerced.
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Stewart concluded that, "if any compulsion be detected in the California procedure,
it is of a dramatically different and less palpable nature than that involved in the
procedures which historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment guarantee."'
124
Indeed, Justice Stewart viewed the court's instruction as a legitimate means of
articulating and bringing into the light of rational discussion a fact
inescapably impressed on thejury's consciousness. The California
procedure is not only designed to protect the defendant against
unwarranted inferences which might be drawn by an uninformed
jury; it is also an attempt by the State to recognize and articulate
what it believes to be the natural probative force of certain facts. "
Finally, Justice Stewart noted that the Model Code of Evidence, the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute had all
endorsed the use of the California procedure. 1
26
2. Applying the Rule
The next decision on the no-comment rule, following Griffin, was Tehan v. Shott.127
In Tehan, the Court held that Griffin was not to be applied retroactively because it was
not based on protection of the accuracy of the truth-seeking function of a trial. 28 In
so holding, the Court abandoned the idea that the no-comment rule was a protection
for the innocent, 129 but rather explained that it is based on the "complex of values" the
privilege represents. 30 Those values exist independent of the truth-seeking function
of a trial, and include the right to individual autonomy, a right to be left alone by the
government, and a right to require the government to bear its burden of proof without
124 Id.
125 Id. at 622.
126 Id. at 622 & nn.6-7; see Andrew A. Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of
the Defendant to Testify, 31 MICH. L. REv. 226 (1932); Walter T. Dunmore, Comment on
Failure ofAccused to Testify, 26 YALE L.J. 464 (1916); Herbert S. Hadley, Criminal Justice
in America: Present Conditions Historically Considered, 11 A.B.A. J. 674, 677 (1925);
Frank H. Hiscock, Criminal Law and Procedure in New York, 26 COLuM. L. REv. 253,
258-62 (1926); Note, Comment on Defendant's Failure to Take the Stand, 57 YALE L.J. 145
(1947). Later, in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court determined that
violation of the no-comment rule could be subjected to harmless error analysis. See United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (holding a Griffin violation harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt).
127 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 415.
130 Id. at 414 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964)).
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the assistance of the defendant. 13' Accordingly, the no-comment rule was interpreted
to be symbolic.
The next decision in this area was Lakeside v. Oregon.' There, the Court held
that the giving of a no-inference instruction over objection did not violate the Fifth
Amendment. 3 3 Ostensibly narrowing the Griffin rule prohibiting comment on a de-
fendant's silence, the Court made clear that the only comment on the defendant's
silence that was prohibited by Griffin was a negative comment. 34
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined in part by Justice Marshall, reiterated that the
right to remain silent at trial was designed, in part, to protect the innocent defendant
who decides not to testify. 3 ' For a judge or prosecutor to call that silence to a jury's
attention in any way "will make the defendant's silence costly indeed.' ' 36 He saw
no reason to override a defendant's decision as to whether that instruction should be
given.' 37
Later that same year the Court decided Lockett v. Ohio.138 There, the Court held
that a prosecutor's references to the state's evidence as "unrefuted" and "uncontra-
dicted," indirect references to the defendant's silence, did not violate the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 139 In that case, defense counsel had drawn the jury's atten-
tion to the defendant's silence by stating that she would testify and by outlining her
defense.' 4 The Court held that, "[w]hen viewed against this background, it seems
clear that the prosecutor's closing remarks added nothing to the impression that had
already been created by Lockett's refusal to testify after the jury had been promised
a defense by her lawyer and told that Lockett would take the stand."'
14 1
'31 See id. at 416. The Court eloquently explained that the privilege represents "the Consti-
tution's concern for the essential values represented by 'our respect for the inviolability of
the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may
lead a private life .... Id. at 416 & 414 n.12 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d
556, 581-82 (1956)).
132 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
"'3 Id. at 340-41.
4 Id. at 338-39.
It is clear from even a cursory review of the facts and the square holding
of the Griffin case that the Court was there concerned only with adverse
comment, whether by the prosecutor or the trial judge--comment by the
prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that
such silence ... is evidence of guilt.
Id. (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)).
i31 Id. at 343.
136 Id. at 347.
137 Id.
138 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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Next, in 1981, in Carter v. Kentucky,'42 the Court entertained an issue that had
been specifically reserved in Griffin and Lakeside: whether the state court was re-
quired, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to give a requested jury in-
struction that the jury could not draw negative inferences from a defendant's failure
to testify.'43 The Court held that a requested instruction was constitutionally re-
quired.'4 Concurring, Justice Powell made clear that he felt compelled by Griffin
to join the Court's conclusion but that he believed Griffin was wrongly decided. 14 5
Then-Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, held that the Court's decision was an erroneous
extension of Griffin. 46
In Baxter v. Palmigiano,47 the Court held that the use of a defendant's silence in
a prison disciplinary proceeding did not violate the Fifth Amendment.'" In doing so,
however, it explained that "his silence was given no more evidentiary value than was
warranted by the facts surrounding his case. This does not smack of an invalid attempt
by the State to compel testimony without granting immunity or to penalize the exer-
cise of the privilege."'49
Later, in United States v. Robinson,5 ' the Court held that the prosecutor's com-
ment that defendant could have taken the stand to testify did not violate the Fifth
Amendment.'15 Similar to its reasoning in Lockett, the Court held that the prosecutor's
comment was a fair response to defense counsel's argument: 52 defense counsel had
argued that the prosecutor had prevented the defendant from explaining his side of
the case. ' Thus, the Court held that, even though the prosecutor's comment that the
defendant could have taken the stand and explained his argument to the jury may have
imposed "some 'cost"' on the defendant for remaining silent, the Fifth Amendment
had not been violated.' The Court rejected the lower court's position that "any
'direct' reference by the prosecutor to the failure of the defendant to testify violates
the Fifth Amendment as construed in Griffin."'155
142 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
141 Id. at 295.
'44 Id. at 288.
145 Id. at 307.
146 Id. at 310. In so holding, Justice Rehnquistquoted Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
in Griffin: "Although compelled to concur in this decision, I am free to express the hope that
the Court will eventually return to constitutional paths which, until recently, it has followed
throughout its history." Id. (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 617 (1965)).
147 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
148 Id. at 309, 316.
14 Id. at 318.
150 485 U.S. 25 (1988).
151 Id. at 26.
151 Id. at 32.
113 Id. at 34.
154 id.
155 Id. at 31. The Court held, "[w]e decline to give Griffin such a broad reading, because
we think such a reading would be quite inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment, which protects
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Finally, in Portuondo v. Agard,156 the Supreme Court addressed the question
whether a prosecutor's comment during summation-that the defendant had been
the only witness with the opportunity to be present and hear the other witnesses and
thus to tailor his testimony-violated the Griffin no-comment rule. 57 The Court held
that it did not, declining to extend Griffin.151 Interestingly, it pointed to the lack of
any historical evidence prohibiting the sort of comment at issue, relying on the long-
standing disqualification for interest that prohibited a defendant from testifying in
the first place. 59 In addition, the Court noted that the comment in Griffin asked the
jury to do what it was prohibited from doing (using the defendant's silence as evi-
dence of guilt) while the comment in Portuondo asked the jury to do what it was
perfectly entitled to do (consider the defendant's presence in evaluating his credi-
bility). "6 Moreover, asking the jury not to consider a defendant's presence was deemed
by the Court to be impossible. 6 ' Finally, the Court opined that Griffin prohibited
comment on the defendant's silence as evidence of guilt, while Portuondo limited the
comment to credibility. 1
62
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, dissented. 163 Relying on Griffin and
Doyle v. Ohio,164 Justice Ginsburg held that the comments in question violated the
defendant's constitutional rights because "where the exercise of constitutional rights
is 'insolubly ambiguous' as between innocence and guilt, a prosecutor may not un-
fairly encumber those rights by urging the jury to construe the ambiguity against the
defendant."' 165 According to Justice Ginsburg, while a trial is a search for truth, a ge-
neric comment in summation "undermines all defendants equally and therefore does
not help answer the question that is the essence of a trial's search for truth: Is this
particular defendant lying to cover his guilt or truthfully narrating his innocence?" "
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg took the majority to task for arguing that the negative
inference from presence in Portuondo is different from the negative inference from
silence in Griffin because the inference from silence is not "natural or irresistible.' 67
In doing so, Justice Ginsburg relied on Griffin and Mitchell to show that the Court
had indeed considered the negative inference from silence natural and irresistible;
against compulsory self-incrimination." Id. at 31-32; see also United States v. Hasting, 461
U.S. 499, 515 (1983).
156 529 U.S. 61 (2000).
... Id. at 65.
15I d. at 61.
'I Id. at 65.
'60 Id. at 68.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 67-68.
163 Id. at 62.
164 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
165 Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617).
166 Id. at 79.
167 Id. at 84.
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indeed, that was why the Court in Carter had required that a limiting instruction be
given whenever requested by the defense.'" In language that could well apply to
Griffin, Justice Ginsburg concluded, "[i]n the end, we are left with a prosecutorial
practice that burdens the constitutional rights of defendants, that cannot be justified
by reference to the trial's aim of sorting guilty defendants from innocent ones, and
that is not supported by our case law."' 69
3. Extending the Rule to Sentencing
In 1999, the Court decided Mitchell v. United States.170 In Mitchell, the Court ad-
dressed the question of whether Griffin should be extended to prohibit a negative
inference against a defendant who does not testify at sentencing. 17' The Court held
that Griffin should be extended to sentencing. 72
The charges against Mitchell arose out of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
173
Mitchell was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute five or more kilo-
grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and with three counts of distribut-
ing cocaine within one thousand feet of a school or playground, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 860(a). 7 1 She pleaded guilty to all four counts, and reserved the right to
contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count. 175 The dis-
trict court indicated that the drug quantity would be determined at sentencing.
76
During the plea colloquy, after the government presented the underlying facts,
the judge asked Mitchell, "Did you do that?" and she responded "[s]ome of it.' 77 She
stated that although she had been present for one of the transactions charged in the dis-
tribution count, she had not delivered the cocaine. 78 The government maintained that
she was liable as an aider and abettor. 179 After the court advised her that she might have
a defense to one count on the theory that she was only present, Mitchell confirmed her
desire to plead guilty and the court accepted her plea; three other co-defendants also
agreed to testify.'8 0 Later at Mitchell's sentencing hearing, the three witnesses adopted
their trial testimony supplemented by additional evidence about the amount of cocaine
168 Id. at 84-85.
169 Id. at 88.
170 526 U.S. 314 (1999).
171 Id. at 316-17.
172 Id. at 317. The Court also held that, in a federal criminal case, a guilty plea does not
waive the self-incrimination privilege as to sentence. Id. at 321.
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sold by Mitchell. 18 According to this testimony, Mitchell worked two or three times
a week selling one and one-half to two ounces of cocaine a day from April to August
1992, and three to five times a week from August 1992 to December 1993.182 From
January to March 1994 she was one of the people in charge of cocaine distribution." 3
On cross-examination one of the witnesses conceded he had not seen Mitchell on
a regular basis during these time periods.' s4 In addition, Mitchell and the government
both referred to the trial testimony of another of the co-defendants, who attributed a
total of two ounces of cocaine to Mitchell in 1992.185 Mitchell put on no evidence and
did not testify. 1
86
The sentencing court credited the testimony that Mitchell had been a regular drug
courier and that she had sold more than five kilograms of cocaine, thus requiring a man-
datory ten-year minimum sentence. 181 One of the reasons the court gave for relying
on the testimony of the codefendants was Mitchell's "not testifying to the contrary." 88
The court sentenced her to a mandatory "minimum of [ten] years imprisonment, [six]
years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $200."'189
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.' 9 The court held that
Mitchell had waived her Fifth Amendment privilege by pleading guilty.' 9' Judge
Michel concurred. 9 2 He reasoned that any error in drawing an adverse inference from
Mitchell's silence was harmless because the evidence supported the judge's finding
on quantity without considering Mitchell's silence.
The Supreme Court disagreed on both issues. "9 First, the Court held that the de-
fendant' s guilty plea did not waive her right against self-incrimination as to sentence
because a guilty plea does not complete the incrimination process where a defendant
is yet to be sentenced. 95 Although the Court began its opinion by noting the general
rule that a witness may not testify about some subjects and invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination about the details, the Court held that the narrow inquiry at a plea col-





185 Id. at 318-19.





191 Id. at 319-20.
192 Id. at 320.
193 Id. at 320-21.
194 Id. at 314-15.
191 Id. at 321.
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plea colloquy the defendant takes the facts out of controversy, so that under the circum-
stances, there is "little danger that the court will be misled by selective disclosure."' 96
Moreover, "[t]reating a guilty plea as a waiver of the privilege at sentencing would
be a grave encroachment on the rights of defendants." 197 Essentially it would convert
the current accusatorial system into an inquisitorial one, where the defendant is com-
pelled to assist in her own punishment. 198
The Court also found nothing in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 that
contemplated such a broad waiver of the privilege. 99 Rule 1 (c)(3) requires a court
to ascertain that the defendant understands that he or she is giving up the right to
self-incrimination at trial.2" The purpose of this rule is to inform the defendant of
what she is giving up by deciding not to go to trial, but not to elicit a waiver for any
other proceedings.2 '
With respect to the negative inference, the Court extended its Griffin prohibition
to sentencing proceedings.22 The Court held that, while negative inferences are avail-
able in civil proceedings, a sentencing hearing falls within the "criminal case" language
of the Fifth Amendment. 20 3 Moreover, drawing such an inference would compel a de-
fendant to participate in her own punishment, which the Court held would violate the
right against self-incrimination.0 4
The Court's holding follows the line ofjurisprudence that places the right to silence
at the core of the accusatorial system. It does not rely on text or history. Thus, in hold-
ing that the government may not rely on the defendant to establish his or her own guilt,
the Court eloquently articulated the importance of the Fifth Amendment privilege to
the U.S. system of justice:
The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for teach-
ing that the question in a criminal case is not whether the defen-
dant committed the acts of which he is accused. The question is
whether the Government has carried its burden to prove its alle-
gations while respecting the defendant's individual rights. The
196 Id. at 315.
Here, petitioner's statement that she had done "some of' the proffered
conduct did not pose a threat to the integrity of factfinding proceedings,
for the purpose of the District Court's inquiry was simply to ensure that
petitioner understood the charges and that there was a factual basis for
the Government's case.
Id. at 323.
197 Id. at 324.
198 Id. at 325 (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)).
199 Id. at 323.
200 id.
201 Id. at 323-24.
202 Id. at 327.
203 Id. at 328-29.
204 Id. at 329.
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Government retains the burden of proving facts relevant to the
crime at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant in
this process at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege.' 5
Significantly, however, the Court limited its holding with respect to adverse infer-
ences only to the essential facts of the charged crime.2°6 That is, because it relied on
the linchpin-of-the-accusatorial-process argument, requiring the prosecution to bear
the burden of proof without the help of the defendant, it did not explicitly discount the
probative worth of silence as evidence of guilt, or address the other policy or practi-
cal arguments against the no-comment rule. The Court clearly opted for the role of
the privilege as requiring the prosecutor to bear the burden of establishing essential
sentencing-based facts without any help from the defendant.20 7
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor
and Thomas.208 Justice Thomas also dissented separately.2 9 Although Justice Scalia
agreed with the majority that a guilty plea is not a waiver of the right against self-
incrimination, Justice Scalia would have held that Mitchell "did not have the right to
have the sentencer abstain from making the adverse inferences that reasonably flow
from her failure to testify.
21 1
Not surprisingly, the dissent relied heavily on the text and history of the right
against self-incrimination and, in particular, the circumstances that existed at the time
the Fifth Amendment was drawn.211 According to the dissent, early colonial courts
expected a defendant to testify and drew a negative inference from a defendant's si-
lence. 212 Eventually, state legislatures enacted statutes prohibiting such an inference,
but that did not elevate the prohibition to constitutional dimension.1 3 As to Griffin,
the dissenters explained that, as a matter of constitutional law, Griffin was an aber-
ration.214 Indeed, Justice Scalia characterized it as a "wrong turn" that should not be
extended to sentencing proceedings.2 5
In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas reiterated his position that Griffin lacked
historical or logical support. 2 6 He characterized it as a decision that "constitutional-
izes a policy choice that a majority of the Court found desirable at the time. 217 Justice
205 Id. at 330.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 331.
209 Id. at 341.
210 Id. at 331.
211 Id. at 332.
212 Id. at 333.
213 Id. at 335.
214 Id. at 332.
215 Id. at 336.
216 Id. at 341.
217 Id. at 343.
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Thomas concluded that he would be willing to reconsider Griffin, but since he agreed
with Justice Scalia that it should not be extended, he joined Justice Scalia's dissent.218
IH. THE MODERN U.K. APPROACH
A. The Modem Debate
In 1972, the Criminal Law Revision Committee, a part-time advisory committee
to the Home Secretary, recommended that, although a defendant would be permitted
to remain silent in the police station and in the courtroom, negative inferences based
on that silence would be permissible. 29 The Committee's position was that the ex-
isting rule unduly favored the guilty. 2 ° The recommended change was roundly de-
nounced by all commentators and was not implemented.22'
In 1979, the government tried again.222 The Philips Royal Commission was ap-
pointed to study the question and concluded that the right to silence was essential
to the accusatorial system and should not be changed.223 According to the Commission,
changing the rule concerning pre-trial silence might increase the risk to the innocent
person who was under police suspicion for the first time, and, on the other hand, would
do nothing to help convict the guilty, who would continue in any event to remain si-
lent.224 As to the right to silence at trial, the Commission concluded that the principle
of requiring the prosecution to prove its case did not permit the use of the defendant
to make that case and that the defendant should not be penalized by comment if she
failed to do so. 2'5 This report was adopted by the government, and public debate was
considered to be at an end. 226
B. Responding to Domestic Terrorism
In 1987, in what has been characterized as an "odd" turn of events, the Home
Secretary suddenly announced that there would again be a "public debate about the
right to silence. 227 In a speech given to the Police Foundation, the Secretary queried
218 Id.
219 CRIM. LAW REVISION COMM., ELEVENTH REPORT, EVIDENCE, 1972, Cmnd. 4991, at 16.
220 MICHAEL ZANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 123-24
(9th ed., Butterworths 1999).
221 Michael Zander, You Have No Right to Remain Silent: Abolition of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in England, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 659, 665 (1996).
222 Id.
223 Id. at 665-66.
224 Id. at 665.
225 Id. at 665-66.
226 ZANDER, supra note 220, at 125-26; Mark Berger, Reforming Confession Law British
Style: A Decade of Experience With Adverse Inferences from Silence, 31 COLuM. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 243, 254 (2000).
227 Zander, supra note 221, at 666.
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whether the interests of justice were being served by allowing "experienced crimi-
nals" to refuse to answer "police questions secure in the knowledge that the trial jury
would never learn of [that silence]."2 8 As one commentator noted, the thrust of the
Secretary's position was that, "[b]y allowing the exercise of the right to silence to be
free of logical adverse evidentiary consequences... the legal system wrongly afforded
protection to the guilty rather than the innocent.
229
The Government ultimately issued Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order
1988 (the "Northern Ireland Order"), which changed the rule for all criminal cases in
Northern Ireland. 230 That order permitted, inter alia, the drawing of adverse inferences
from an accused's failure before being charged or upon being charged to mention any
fact relied on in his defense at trial. 231 The Order also stated that silence could be cor-
roboration of other evidence.232 The same inferences could be drawn where a suspect
failed to explain the presence of any suspicious object, substance or mark, or where
his presence at the scene or at the time of the crime seemed "reasonably suspicious"
but he failed to explain it.2 33 The order was not limited to terrorism-related cases, but
applied to all prosecutions in Northern Ireland.2 4
During the next year, the Home Office Working Group issued a report that rec-
ommended similar provisions for England and Wales, i.e. that a defendant's failure to
answer questions or to mention a fact later relied on at trial could be used to support
an inference that his subsequent defense was untrue or to impeach his credibility gen-
erally.2 35 It could not, however, be used to support an inference of guilt.236
The Government did not adopt this report .2' This was probably due to a public
climate dominated by concern over several highly publicized miscarriages of justice,
the Guildford Four, the Maguires, and the Birmingham Six. 238 However, when these
convictions were quashed, a new commission was set up, the Royal Commission on
Criminal Justice ("The Runciman Commission").3 The mandate of this Commission
was to study the entire system of criminal justice, largely to figure out why these mis-
carriages had occurred, but the right to silence was specifically mentioned in its terms
of reference." Opponents of change argued that permitting a negative inference would
increase the likelihood of wrongly convicting the innocent either by (1) permitting
228 Berger, supra note 226, at 253.
229 Id.
230 Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order, 1988, SI 1988/1987 (N. Ir. 20).
231 Berger, supra note 226, at 254.
232 Id. at 254-55.
233 Id. at 255.
234 Id. at 254.
235 ZANDER, supra note 220, at 158.
236 Id. at 158-59.
237 Zander, supra note 221, at 666.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 666-67.
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an inference of guilt based on silence that was not empirically strong; or (2) forcing
the otherwise vulnerable to testify before the jury.24' Others argued that a new law
would shift the burden of proof from the prosecution by requiring a silent defendant
to give a reason for the silence.242 Proponents argued that the then-existing law ig-
nored common sense and allowed criminals and terrorists to "make a mockery of [the
British] system of... justice., 24 3 They also argued that it was reasonable to expect an
accused person to offer an explanation of incriminating circumstances and thus that
there was no reason not to allow a jury or court to take the absence of such an expla-
nation into account. 2" Proponents disagreed that the new law would abolish the right
to silence: the right to silence would remain, and no one would be compelled to give
any evidence.245
The Runciman Commission reached the same conclusion as the earlier Philips
Commission and recommended, by a vote of 9 to 2, that the existing right to silence
be maintained. 246 However, the Home Secretary announced that he intended to adopt
the view of the minority.247 According to him, '"he so-called right to silence is ruth-
lessly exploited by terrorists. What fools they must think we are. It's time to call a
halt to this charade. The so-called right to silence will be abolished." 248 The next year,
Parliament passed the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA).249 In that
statute, the provisions of the Northern Ireland Order were extended to all criminal cases
in England and Wales.25°
Section 34 of that CJPOA permits the drawing of a negative inference based on a
suspect's failure to mention any fact on which he relies at trial.2 1' Thus, for example,
if a suspect remains silent and then continues that silence as a defendant at trial, no
negative inference is allowed. However, the Act also permits a negative inference
to be drawn based on a defendant's failure to testify at trial.2 52
The House of Lords upheld this provision in Murray v. Director of Public
Prosecutions.213 Thereafter, the European Court of Human Rights upheld it against
241 Id. at 665.
242 Id. at 666.
243 Chase, supra note 81, at 938 (quoting 237 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (1994) 430).
244 Zander, supra note 221, at 667-68, 670.
245 Id. at 666-67.




250 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33 (Eng.) [hereinafter "CJPOA"].
251 Id. § 34(1). Accordingly, the U.K. version of the U.S. Miranda warnings reads: "You
do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when ques-
tioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evi-
dence." Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (Code C, para. 10.5.); ZANDER, supra
note 220, at 160.
252 CJPOA § 35(2); ZANDER, supra note 220, at 443-44.
253 Murray v. D.P.P., [1992] A.C. 1 (H.L.) (U.K.).
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a claim that the drawing of adverse inferences from the accused's silence violated
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.'
Several limitations exist in the Act. First, it is clear that a finding of guilt may not
rest solely on an inference based on the defendant's failure to testify;255 nor may the
inference assist the prosecution to make out a prima facie case.256 Moreover, a court
may still instruct a jury against drawing an adverse inference if there is an evidentiary
basis for doing so or some exceptional factor in the case makes that the fair course to
take.257 However, no standards for exercising this discretion are laid out in the Act.
In this connection, the courts have held that the fact that a defendant may decide not
to testify because he may be cross-examined as to his bad character is relevant, but
is not in and of itself sufficient to avoid the usual negative inference instruction.258
In 1998, in response to a deadly terrorist bombing in Omagh, Northern Ireland, the
British government submitted what was ultimately enacted as the Criminal Justice
(Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998.59 This act is applicable only to Northern Ireland
terrorism prosecutions, which are defined under other, earlier legislation.26 The Act
permits a fact finder evaluating alleged membership in a terrorist organization to draw
adverse inferences from an accused's failure to mention any fact material to any ques-
tion asked that "he would reasonably [have] been expected to answer. '"261 The only
condition is that he be "charged, informed that he might be prosecuted, or was being
questioned under caution by an officer for a covered offense. '2 62 Unlike the CJPOA,
the negative inference is not limited to those trials at which a fact is subsequently relied
upon by the defendant that had not been mentioned earlier.263 By this extension of the
earlier Act, the adverse inference can be drawn whenever a suspect fails to provide in-
formation to the police.26 Interestingly, although the CJPOA was passed under a con-
servative government, this extension was passed under a liberal government.
265
IV. EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES
Several reasons help to explain why the United States and the United Kingdom
have adopted different approaches to the no-comment rule. Chief among them are:
(1) the difference between U.S. Constitutional supremacy and U.K. Parliamentary
254 Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (1996).
255 CJPOA § 38(3); R v. Cowan, (1996) Q.B. 373 (U.K.).
256 CJPOA § 34(2)(c); Cowan, Q.B. at 373-74;.
257 ZANDER, supra note 220, at 444.
258 R v. Taylor, 1999 CRIM. L.R. 77.
259 Berger, supra note 226, at 266.
260 Id. at 266 & n.101.
161 Id. at 266 & n.102.
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supremacy; (2) the complex problems of federalism in the United States; (3) the U.S.
historical experience in the protection of individual rights against state encroach-
ment; (4) the U.K.'s monarchy and class structure; and (5) the U.K.'s exposure to
domestic terrorism.
A. Constitutional v. Parliamentary Supremacy
In the United States, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Any law
passed by Congress is subject to judicial review for constitutionality. If a statute
is found to be unconstitutional, Congress must enact a new one.266 In the United
Kingdom, however, until recently, there was no written constitution. Parliament was
supreme, and there was no provision for judicial review of statutes. If appropriate
fact finding and new policy judgments dictate the passage by Parliament of a new
law, no precedent prevents it or effects its contents.
In the United States, of course, that is not the case. In Griffin, for example, the
Court had to wrestle not only with the simple question of whether the no-comment
rule was wise policy; it had to determine that question in light of its precedent on fed-
eralism. The first judgment is legislative, the second, judicial. The first is much easier
to change, as social circumstances change; the second, being bound by precedent and
laden with federalism concerns, is much more difficult.
B. Federalism
One way to look at Griffin is that it was the result of the Court's attempt, through
selective incorporation, to set a constitutional minimum for state criminal proceedings
at a time when constitutional protections were otherwise missing from state proceed-
ings. Much has been written about the selective incorporation debate.2 67 Briefly, over
the course of many decisions, the Supreme Court held that most parts of the first eight
amendments should be absorbed through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause and were thus binding on the states.268 Ultimately, however, as part of that ab-
sorptive process, the Court held that the full extent of the specific right as it applied
to the federal courts was also binding on the states.269 Thus, whatever interpretation
of the specific right applied in the federal courts was also deemed to apply to the states
through the Due Process Clause.
As many justices and commentators have noted, this approach was no more than
a compromise without historical or analytic support.27 ° It also drastically altered the
266 Id. at 245-46.
261 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Bill ofRights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL.
L. REv. 929 (1965).
268 Id. at 934.
269 Id. at 933.
270 Id. at 934.
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federalist system set up by the Constitution, by virtue of which the states were sup-
posed to serve as laboratories; the states were to have the freedom to vary their proce-
dures consistent with a minimum standard of fundamental fairness.27j Arguably, as
a result of incorporation, the states have been forced into uniformity.
Of course, the doctrine of incorporation applied only to the Bill of Rights. It did
not bind the states to federal procedural statutes, rules of evidence, or exercises of the
federal court's supervisory power. Thus, when Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3481,
which abolished the disqualification of the defendant as a witness and included the no-
comment rule, that new statute applied only to the Federal courts. 72 Just like any other
act of Congress, it had no applicability to state courts. When, in Griffin, the Supreme
Court was asked to review a state statute that disagreed with the federal statutory no-
comment rule, it had already decided (in Malloy) that the state and federal Fifth Amend-
ment standards had to be exactly the same.273 Having taken that step, it was a short
additional, if erroneous, step to the conclusion that the Fifth Amendment required states
to adopt the statutory no-inference rule under the doctrine of selective corporation. In-
deed, that is exactly how the Griffin majority opinion reads: it substitutes the language
of the Fifth Amendment for the federal statute.274
C. The Relative Importance of Individual Rights
As noted above,275 British colonial Americans claimed the rights of British citizens.
In addition, however, they sought to protect those rights against increasingly intrusive
encroachments by the far-away monarch. In short, the United States was born out of
revolt against the arbitrary power of central authority. For more than two centuries,
the distrust of the state and the protection of the individual from encroachment by
the state has continued to be a dominant concern in U.S. jurisprudence. Interestingly,
the Fifth Amendment gained renewed respect during the McCarthy period, when it
was publicly invoked against the persecution of the House Un-American Activities
Committee in the period just before Griffin reconsidered its constitutional status.276
The extent to which geography and location influenced these values is clear. North
America was far away. Once the British began to use English judges to try the colo-
nists, or even to require the colonists to be tried in England, the injustice became appar-
ent: they were there and we were here. In addition, North America was very, very big.
One of the causes of the revolution was the King's refusal to let the colonists settle
271 Id. at 936-38.
272 See 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2000).
273 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
274 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613-14 ("If the words 'Fifth Amendment' are substituted for 'act'
and for 'statute,' the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is reflected.").
275 See supra pp. 932-33.
276 See Friendly, supra note 1, at 671 (the history of the privilege includes defending it
"against the opprobrium that Senator Joseph McCarthy and others sought to heap on many
who properly invoked it").
954 [Vol. 15:927
THE VULNERABILITY OF GRIFFIN V. CALIFORNIA
west of the Appalachian Mountains.277 This must of course have seemed arbitrary,
too, since there was so much land and so much opportunity. The sense of an inherent
right to this limitless opportunity free from the state's intrusion has always character-
ized the U.S. personality.
The United Kingdom's political and geographic experiences are quite different.
British citizens are, and have always been, subjects. Far from rebelling against cen-
tralized authority, they consider themselves subjects of the monarchy, the antithesis
of the U.S. 'individual rights' mentality. Moreover, in comparison to the United States,
the country is small and densely populated. As a result, U.K. citizens demand more
of each other, and are willing to give up more to maintain social cohesion. Aside from
the far-flung, historical empire, there is no open frontier for expansion.
Socially, of course, the countries are also very different. Throughout most of its
history, the United States has not had a rigid class structure. Importantly, mobility be-
tween the classes has always been considered theoretically possible and every indi-
vidual entitled to seek it. The Horatio Alger story has always been a central cultural
theme. U.K. society has never been that way. Because of the long-standing class struc-
ture in England, the English do not have a social experience of limitless opportunity.
There is little social mobility; thus expectations of any individual's opportunity for
social mobility are extremely limited.
D. Domestic Terrorism
As noted above, the United Kingdom's decision to allow a negative inference
from silence arose directly in response to IRA terrorism in Northern Ireland. 2 ' The
changes were first applied in Northern Ireland in 1988; six years later, rising crime rates
led Parliament to expand the rules to everyone charged with a crime in England and
Wales, rules that had before only seemed appropriate for terrorists.279 Ultimately, the
idea simply became more acceptable, and the balance between public safety and indi-
vidual freedoms dictated the choice by Parliament to permit the drawing of adverse
inferences from silence in all criminal trials.
V. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF GRIFFIN V. CALIFORNIA
As noted above, the Griffin decision has always been subject to substantial criti-
cism. Four factors place it in unique jeopardy now. First, commentators and dissenting
judges have identified its analytical vulnerability, i.e. lack of textual support, its illogic
and its conflation of statutory and constitutional rules. Second, critics have traced its
lack of historical support.280 Its text repeatedly has been deemed inconsistent with its
277 H. COMMANGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 48-50 (8th ed. 1968).
278 See supra Part III.A.
279 Chase, supra note 81, at 930.
280 See supra Part II.A. 1.
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history, its history with its underlying policy, and its policy inconsistent with its text.2"'
Third, the right to silence operates aggressively in opposition to the search for truth. 82
Importantly, as well, it has been recognized many times that the Fifth Amendment
is uniquely responsive to contemporary events.28 3 Fourth, given the Court's modem
conservative leanings, the Fifth Amendment's unique responsiveness to contemporary
events, and the modem threat of terrorism, it is likely that the conservative course pur-
sued in the United Kingdom and predicted by Wigmore will occur here.2s The no-
comment rule may not survive.
A. Griffin's Analytic Vulnerability
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in Mitchell, the text of the Fifth
Amendment does not support the conclusion that it prohibits adverse comment on
silence.28 5 The language prohibits compulsion; in the no-comment situation, the de-
fendant is not being compelled to testify at all.28 6
Moreover, while the Griffin majority viewed jury instructions as a penalty for
the exercise of the right to silence, in some senses it may cabin the fact-finders use of
silence in a way that is helpful to the defendant. After Griffin, a judge can instruct the
jurors that they may not base a guilty verdict on the defendant's silence, that silence
may only be used in determining the credibility of evidence as to which the defendant
would have information, and that the prosecution bears the burden of proof nonethe-
less.28 7 Without such instructions, a jury could use a defendant's silence to support a
conclusion of guilt. Even if the comment rule is viewed as a penalty, however, which
in effect compels a defendant to testify to avoid it, the penalty is too minimal to be of
constitutional dimension; the inference of guilt from silence is one that the jury will
draw regardless of a court or prosecutor's comments.
Closely connected to this criticism is the claim that prohibiting an adverse in-
ference from silence is illogical. It is undisputed that evidence of a defendant's con-
duct generally is admissible.28 8 The evidentiary significance of silence in the face
of accusation is also well-established.8 9 When a person remains silent in the face
of accusation, that conduct is deemed to be acquiescence. The Supreme Court has
281 See, e.g., Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Adverse Inferences from Silence, 22
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1005, 1009-11 (1989) [hereinafter DOJ Report]; Friendly, supra note
1; McKay, supra note 2.
282 See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
DOJ Report, supra note 281, at 1007; Friendly, supra note 1.
283 See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 1, at 677 n.33, and cases cited therein.
284 See supra note 13.
285 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 331.
286 Id. at 341.
287 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
288 DOJ Report, supra note 281, at 1010.
289 Id. at 1049, 1099.
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also held that, where a defendant testifies but refuses to answer certain questions, that
silence may be commented upon before the jury.290 Similarly, where a defendant fails
to testify at his first trial, but testifies at a retrial, his silence at the first trial may be used
in evidence at his second trial.29' Most recently, the Mitchell majority, while extending
the no-comment rule to the facts underlying sentence, left open the possibility that
comment could be made on a defendant's silence as to other facts, implicitly recog-
nizing that silence can be probative of guilt.292 These rulings indicate that the Court
may indeed conclude that silence has some evidentiary significance in fact. Moreover,
it is generally permissible to ask the jury to draw an adverse inference where a party
fails to proffer a witness or other source of proof that is within his control and that
could offer favorable, relevant evidence.293 Adverse comment on a party's silence
is also permitted in clemency cases, deportation proceedings, and prison disciplinary
actions. 294 Yet the no-comment rule essentially requires that jurors leave the natural
relevance of such evidence behind.
Moreover, as Justice Scalia so succinctly put it, "in a breathtaking act of sor-
cery [Griffin] simply transformed legislative policy into constitutional command. 295
While the Court relied upon its then-recent holding in Malloy v. Hogan that the Fifth
Amendment was to bind the states to the same standards to which it bound the Federal
courts,296 Malloy did not apply to statutory standards, but only to constitutional ones.
Incorporation through the Due Process Clause was never meant to require the states
to conform to acts of Congress.
B. Griffin's Lack of Historical Support
It is difficult to discern historical support for the no-comment rule. Negative in-
ferences from silence were indeed permitted throughout history until they were prohib-
ited by statute in 1878.297 For most of that history, defendants were disqualified from
290 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,493 (1917) (upholdingjury instruction where
defendant testified that, "if he has failed to deny or explain acts of an incriminating nature,"
comment and consideration by the jury would be proper "since it is a legitimate inference that,
could he have truthfully denied or explained the incriminating evidence against him, he would
have done so").
291 Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926); see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308 (1976).
292 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 320 (1999).
293 DOJ Report, supra note 281, at 1010.
294 For a list of these types of cases, see Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 1337-38 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
295 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 336. In Griffin, the Court held that, "[i]f the words 'Fifth Amend-
ment' are substituted for 'act' and for 'statute,' the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is
reflected." Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965).
296 378 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1964).
297 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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testifying under oath based on interest, but negative inferences at trial were routinely
drawn from their failure to speak before trial when questioned by a magistrate under
the Marian Committal Statute.298 In addition, because there was no right to counsel,
defendants were expected to speak, albeit unsworn; the failure to answer questions
was deemed to support the conclusion that the defendant could not deny the truth.299
In any event, without counsel, silence was suicidal, and so most defendants chose
to speak.3"
Thus, at the time the Fifth Amendment was passed, the colonists were concerned
with something else: the not-so-distant memory of compulsion by oath or torture
and the then-current unrestrained power of the distant King and his judges. 30' Nega-
tive inferences based on silence were routinely drawn. It is undisputed that the Fifth
Amendment was not meant to be a mechanism for law reform, but rather to protect
the individual against the power of the King.30 2
History establishes that it was not until Congress and the states began to enact
statutes rescinding the disqualification for interest that the no-comment question ever
arose. 30 3 Although these statutes were passed, the provision prohibiting adverse in-
ferences was criticized by uniquely respected judges, professional organizations, and
commentators. °4 That criticism has continued unabated to the present.3 5
Moreover, the privilege itself was created to prevent punishment for religious and
private beliefs.3° 6 It continued as a protection against a distant and arbitrary monarch.307
It gained respect during the McCarthy period as a protection against political perse-
cution.30 8 One must seriously ask whether these historical contexts and the values they
represent necessarily required that the privilege and its no-comment rule be adopted
in full through selective incorporation in state proceedings involving, as they generally
do, murder, rape, robbery, burglary and other serious crimes. 309 Now, of course, the
question is even more stark; should the history of the privilege in preventing religious
and political persecution apply in cases involving terrorism?
298 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
299 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
301 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
30 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
302 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
303 See supra Part I.F.2.
31 See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
305 See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999).
" Friendly, supra note 1, at 678.
307 HELMHOIZET AL., supra note 17, at 131-32.
308 Friendly, supra note 1, at 671.
309 See id. at 678-79 ("While no one could sustain the thesis that in 1789 the privilege was
limited to political and religious crimes, neither can anyone demonstrate that it would ever
have come into existence if its proponents had been murderers and rapists rather than John
Lilburne in London and William Bradford in Philadelphia.").
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C. Evolving Supreme Court Standards
1. The Ascendancy of Accuracy
Accuracy, fairness, federalism, efficiency, and the protection of the individual
against the state are all values underlying the U.S. adversary system.10 Over the years,
the Supreme Court's balance of these values has changed. When Griffin was decided,
in the Warren Court era, the Court was attempting to create a constitutional minimum
for the entire country, and the balance favored fairness and individual/state protection.
The incorporation doctrine reflected this, based as it was on determining which enu-
merated rights were essential to fundamental fairness. 31' Griffin was a product of that
jurisprudential thinking.
Over the years, the Supreme Court's balance of these factors has changed. As a
result of incorporation, the Court has had to contend with the effects of its decisions
on a huge volume of dangerous state crimes, and, in response, has veered away from
fairness and individual autonomy in favor of state's rights, accuracy, and efficiency.
No longer concerned about conformity to a minimum of fairness among the states, the
Court's focus has been on federalism-allowing the states more leeway in setting their
own criminal justice standards to deal with their own serious public safety concerns.1 2
Thus, to the extent that the no-comment rule is not about protecting the innocent
from wrongful conviction, it will receive less protection.3 3 It has become a right of
individual autonomy, a right to be left alone by the government 3 4 and a right to re-
quire the government to "shoulder the entire load.' 315 None of these values relate to
accuracy in truth-seeking.316
Indeed, the right to silence interferes with the accuracy, or truth-seeking function
of a trial. The defendant is one of the best sources of evidence, and is indeed, used as
the best source of evidence in an inquisitorial justice system. The fact that a defendant
310 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PROSECUTING CRIME 51-57 (2003).
31 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
312 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 670 (1984).
13 Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
314 Id. at 414 n.12.
315 Id. at 415.
316 The purpose of the no-comment rule
is to be found in the whole complex of values that the privilege against
self-incrimination itself represents, values described in the Malloy case
as reflecting "recognition that the American system of criminal prose-
cution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is its essential mainstay .... Governments, state and federal,
are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence inde-
pendently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge
against an accused out of his own mouth."
Id. at 414 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964)).
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may, with impunity, remain silent hinders both investigatory efforts and truth-seeking
efforts. As such, it is a natural target to those concerned with the threat of terrorism.
2. The Ascendancy of History and Text
Another analytic trend appears to be in the making: the ascendancy of history and
text over underlying purpose as the basis for constitutional interpretation. For ex-
ample, in Crawford v. Washington,317 the conservative justices on the Court brought
to a screeching halt the Court's modem Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as it ap-
plied to the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule."1 8 Over
the course of many decisions over many years, the Court had held that the underlying
purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to ensure reliability of evidence and thus
that the admission of hearsay did not violate the Clause as long as the evidence was
reliable.1 9 Instead, in Crawford the Court held that history and text supported the
conclusion that the Confrontation Clause required cross-examination of any hearsay
evidence that could be characterized as "testimonial," e.g., prior testimony, deposi-
tions, affidavits, statements to police, and the like, and had no relevance whatsoever
to any other form of hearsay proof.320 Were a similar abrupt shift in analysis to occur
with respect to the no-comment rule, its support would be further weakened.
D. Domestic Terrorism
One need look no further than the United Kingdom to see that the public threat
of domestic terrorism can have a major impact on the balance of criminal justice values.
The first Parliamentary inroads on the no-comment rule were made in Northern Ireland
in response to IRA terrorism. 32 These changes were made despite a background of
long standing social and political opposition to suggestions for similar change.322 From
there, the Northern Ireland rules were applied throughout the United Kingdom.
323
There is reason to believe that the same re-balancing of values will occur in the
United States. As noted above, the privilege has been viewed as uniquely responsive
to contemporary events. Its historical underpinnings would require it to prevent re-
ligious and political persecution, and even the arbitrary power of the state in state crimi-
nal prosecutions. But, despite the value of individual autonomy, terrorism may push
the privilege beyond where it can go. This is what happened in the United Kingdom.
317 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
318 Id.
9 See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
320 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-52.
321 See supra Part IV.D.
322 See supra Part III.A.
323 Id.
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There are signs that the United States is not immune from these changes. Indeed,
the passage and extension of the Patriot Act, with its information-gathering provisions,
and the ultimate acceptance of the President's program of warrantless eavesdropping
show that increased concern about public safety has already caused a rebalancing of
values. 324 This rebalancing has resulted in a new individual-versus-the-state calculus
and accompanying limitations on personal autonomy. The already vulnerable priv-
ilege against self-incrimination, particularly its no-comment rule, may well be the
next victim.
On the other hand, in Mitchell, the Supreme Court majority took a stand in favor
of the no-comment rule as an essential component of the U.S. accusatorial system,
a component of the system that reinforces the government's burden of proof and the
requirement that it shoulder that burden entirely without the assistance of the de-
fendant. To continue its narrow margin, the Supreme Court justices in the majority
should emphasize the consistent historical evidence of that role. Even in its present,
more conservative and fearful state of mind, mainstream U.S. opinion would likely still
reject the image of a prosecutor using a defendant's decision to remain silent-the
statement "Prove your case against me"-as actual evidence of guilt.
CONCLUSION
Griffin's no-comment rule has never faced a challenge as daunting as that posed
by modern domestic terrorism. Although Griffin was recently reaffirmed and extended
to sentencing in Mitchell, it garnered the narrowest majority, at least one justice is pre-
pared to overrule it, and three others doubt its analytic integrity. To the extent that the
Supreme Court's support for the rule is based neither on text nor history, it has been
criticized and continues to be vulnerable.
If the United States follows the path the United Kingdom chose to take in response
to domestic terrorism and retools its individual/state calculus, the no-comment rule may
not survive. However, the United States has a written Constitutional provision pre-
venting self-incrimination. And, for several social, demographic, and political reasons,
individual rights are more valued in the United States than in the United Kingdom's
equation. As in Mitchell, judicial adherence to core U.S. values concerning the rela-
tionship of the state and the individual would preserve the no-comment rule. These
values were present when the United States was formed and are firmly grounded in
United States history.
324 See, e.g., Bush Holds Press Conference, Aggressively Defends NSA Eavesdropping,
Patriot Act, WHITE HOUSE BULL., Dec. 19, 2005; Maura Reynolds, Renewal of Patriot Act
Passes Senate, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at Al; Scott Shane, N.S.A. Audit of Spying Is Not
Assessing Legality, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at A 19; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Republican Speaks
Up, Leading Others to Challenge Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,2006, at A1; Editorial, This
Call May Be Monitored... ,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, § 4, 11; see also Douglas C. McNabb
& Matthew R. McNabb, Of Bugs, The President, and the NSA: National Security Agency
Intercepts Within the United States, THE CHAMPION, March 2006, at 10.
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